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Ageing and the Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
Pension System’s Asset-liability 
(Mis)Matching 
 
Abstract: The study present how in the late 1930s-1940s a 
new, modern pension system was introduced in America 
without any theoretical basis, as a kind of arbitrary mix of 
existing pension systems, to replace the by then non-
functioning “traditional pension system” in which working 
children maintained their ageing parents in exchange for 
having been raised. Later, in 1958, they found an ideology for 
the system, “solidarity between generations,” but this didn’t fit 
in with the system’s economic foundations, with the fact that 
the modern, pay-as-you-go pension system distributes the 
profits of raising children amongst the older generation 
regardless of how much people have contributed to it. This 
made raising children unprofitable, which provided a strong 
incentive to avoid it, thus launching the ageing process. 
Moreover, the modern pension system, also as a result of 
ageing, is making increasingly large and uncovered promises 
to the retired generation. The system may be repaired by 
matching the asset (raising children) side to the liabilities 
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(pension promise) side, for example, by only promising a 
pension to those who have contributed to the system (through 
raising children or accumulating savings), and only to the 
extent of that contribution. Contribution payments are an 
obligation, the repayment of the cost of people’s upbringing, 
with relation to which no pension is automatically due. By 
doing so, the 3
rd
 pillar of the modern pension system will also 
have been capitalized using a special kind of capital: human 
capital. 
 
Key words: Modern Pension Systems, Pay-as-you-go, 
Pension Reform, the Human Capital-based Pension System 
 
Introduction 
Eighty-something years ago in the mid-1930s, the developed 
industrial world (the United States, Western Europe, and 
Central Europe) looked a lot different than it does now in 
many respects, with different capacities and problems. Just to 
name a few: 
 In contrast to today (and the situation a few 
generations prior to that), the financial basis for 
people’s old-age livelihood was uncertain. This, 
coupled with the protracted global economic crisis 
(with low demand and high unemployment), 
caused significant political tensions. 
 The population was mainly made up of young 
people and was continuously growing, since: 
o Marriage was to all intents and purposes the 
only legitimate form of relationship. 
o It was partly an expectation for there to be 
several children within a family, and in part, it 
was challenging to avoid there being children. 
o For most social classes, raising children was 
not (yet) particularly expensive, and in fact 
(although much fewer than previously) there 
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were still classes for whom having children 
from the child’s relatively young age was 
regarded as a financially favorable 
undertaking. 
 It was discovered—first in practice, followed by a 
kind of theoretical stamp of approval from the pen 
of Keynes (1936/1965)—that the transfer of 
income from classes that are generally more 
inclined to accumulate savings to those who 
immediately spend them is a solution to low 
demand, for example, stimulates the economy.  
It was under such conditions that a significant social 
innovation was introduced in the United States, the pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) pension system. Certain elements of this may 
have been similar to the existing systems, but it was radically 
different, overall. Its main and extremely novel characteristic 
was that no mathematical reserve was accumulated in relation 
to future expected benefits (only a liquidity reserve that was 
several orders of magnitude less), and the contributions paid 
into the system were to all intents and purposes immediately 
distributed as benefits (as indicated, in theory, by the 
expression PAYG). This enabled the immediate handling of 
two pressing problems: 
1. They were immediately able to pay a pension to 
people who retired not long after the system was 
introduced, following only a short period of 
contribution payment, thus mitigating the above-
mentioned social tensions. 
2. A significant and continuously increasing income 
was transferred to a stratum of society (older 
people) who were almost guaranteed to spend 
most of it on consumption, meaning the new 
pension system was itself a great Keynesian 
stimulus. 
The flaw in the idea was that the solution lacked 
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theoretical foundations, and as a result, the operators of the 
system were concerned about possibly having established a 
Ponzi scheme (Blackburn, 2003). Two decades later, 
Samuelson wrote a paper (Samuelson, 1958) that was regarded 
at the time and is still regarded as the until then missing 
theoretical foundation of the PAYG system. The operators of 
the system were relieved (Blackburn, 2003), and now rejected 
the regular accusations of the opposers of the system (usually 
supporters of capitalised pension systems) with relation to the 
Ponzi scheme (although in 2017 the Economist already praised 
Samuelson (The Economist, 2017), as someone who proved 
that good Ponzi schemes are also possible). Much has changed 
since then. However: 
 In the developed world, most older people in most 
countries primarily maintain themselves from 
PAYG pension systems. 
 The financial foundations of these are increasingly 
uncertain, however, given the fact that society is 
increasingly made up of older people, since. 
o The ratio of marriages is continuously falling; 
many types of legitimate relationship exist. 
o Having children is no longer an expectation 
even in marriage, and contraception is easily 
accessible.  
o Raising children takes a long time and is 
becoming increasingly expensive and is no 
longer a financially rewarding undertaking for 
practically any class. 
 The Keynesian stimulus has since become a 
slightly “overused” element of economic policy; 
large, and continuously increasing government 
debt has become the norm, which to a certain 
extent itself also shows the characteristics of a 
Ponzi scheme. 
Overall, what was a great social innovation 80 years 
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ago is now finding itself increasingly obviously in trouble in 
an ageing world, to the coming about of which it has probably 
itself contributed, ending up as its own foundation. We, 
therefore, need a new social innovation. 
This chapter attempts to prove the following 
statements: 
1. Samuelson did not, in fact, provide the philosophy 
for a good Ponzi scheme or the existing PAYG 
systems (but something completely different, 
fundamentally a solution to an imagined 
situation), because… 
2. …existing PAYG systems are the unprincipled 
combination of other (logically pure) systems. 
3. However, it would have been possible (and it still 
is possible) to bring about a good PAYG system 
that at the time would have handled the same 
problems that this bad PAYG system handled. 
4. However, this is funded just like all the other 
logically pure systems, precisely because it is not 
a Ponzi scheme, although the capital is entirely 
different of what the supporters of the usually 
funded system regard as capital. The recognition 
and realization of this could be a true social 
innovation. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: it first 
presents the characteristics and main problems associated with 
logically pure pension systems, then compares these to the 
characteristics of the PAYG system, determining that it is a 
kind of unprincipled combination of the former. It then 
examines Samuelson’s solution and determines that it, in fact, 
concerns a special case that does not exist in reality, and which 
cannot really be applied in general form to reality (since it 
disregarded essential things), and also that it does not in fact 
concern existing PAYG systems. The chapter then examines 
how a logically pure PAYG system could have been 
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established and could still be established today. Finally, the 
chapter reviews today’s main ideas for pension reform and 
shows that these do not lead to a long-term solution. 
 
The Characteristics of Logically Pure Pension Systems and 
Their Main Problems 
Looking back at history, roughly three forms of economically 
sound and sustainable old-age subsistence are distinguishable. 
 
“Pension Insurance” 
The first is living from previously acquired or inherited assets 
(primarily from its regular dividends, and perhaps from the 
partial or full depletion of the “capital”), also in old age. This 
was always the prerogative of a relatively small group and of 
course “still has not gone out of fashion” today. During the 
course of time, more and more people accumulated enough 
(but not necessarily more) capital during the course of their 
active years from which they could survive during their old 
age. The modern business form of this solution is life annuity 
insurance, or in general, the pension insurance provided by 
insurance companies. Its economic essence is the 
accumulation of a reserve, or (in the case of annuity insurance) 
the sharing of risk. 
The solution may be called pension “insurance,” but 
there is not necessarily a need for an insurer in every phase 
(insurers naturally attempt to make themselves indispensable 
in every phase). Accordingly, pension insurance is not 
necessarily a single insurance “product,” or not every part of 
the solution is definitely linked to insurance, as expressed by 
the word “plan” that is usually applied to such situations in 
English. As a “pension plan,” pension insurance can be split 
into two temporally separate phases, the accumulation and 
decumulation phase. Accumulation, meaning the accruement 
of the capital required to provide a living in old age, can occur 
in practically any form (e.g., in government bonds, investment 
169 
 
funds, shares, property, a combination of these), and liquidity 
is not a particular issue; capital can be invested for a long 
term. Insurance companies (and depending on the regulations 
of the given country, other financial institutions) naturally 
attempt to assure that this accumulation occurs with them.  
Decumulation is the (partial) depletion of this capital, 
and/or its previous and continuous dividends, which may 
occur in many forms and using several solutions. Its most 
obvious form is the purchasing of a life annuity using the 
accumulated capital. Those who choose this have maximized 
the (monthly) pension derived from their accumulated capital, 
while to all intents and purposes deciding that they themselves 
will be spending the full capital and its dividends (while 
perhaps giving smaller amounts to their relatives out of the 
annuity received).  
The opposite of a life annuity is perpetuity, which 
merely means that the owner of the capital will always only be 
spending the (real) yield of the capital while the (real) value of 
the capital remains permanent and can be inherited in full 
following their death. This apparently only allows for a much 
lower standard of living during retirement compared to a 
normal life annuity, and therefore is only practical given a 
large amount of accumulated capital.  
People often find compromises that lie somewhere 
between the two, such as a guaranteed life annuity, joint 
annuity, or simple capital depletion coupled with a life annuity 
that has a long deferral time. 
The “funded” (capitalized) and “defined contribution” 
(DC) general professional attributes may be linked to pension 
insurance or a pension insurance plan. In contrast to PAYG 
pension systems with no capital or (often only partially 
capitalized) “defined benefit” (DB) pension funds, the funded, 
or sometimes fully funded attribute indicates a stressed 
characteristic that is otherwise self-evident, it could hardly be 
anything else. The “defined contribution” is also a self-evident 
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characteristic, at least in the accumulation phase. This is why 
it is possible to state at all that in the beginning pension funds 
were practically exclusively of a DB character, meaning that 
the employer promised a concrete pension or determined a 
“pension formula” with which the concrete pension to be 
received could be calculated. The PAYG system also took the 
DB attribute from the pension funds. 
If the pension insurance operates as a normal or 
deferred life annuity during the decumulation phase, it also 
includes a risk distribution element. The risk is the expected 
remaining lifespan, which is uncertain for everybody.  
The economic essence of pension insurance is the 
voluntary balancing of income and consumption during one’s 
adult lifetime (only taking into account the active and old age 
inactive periods), with the accumulation of reserves and its 
scheduled spending (or that of its yield), possibly with the 
support of risk-sharing (decumulation)—and with the possible 
inheritance of part of the accumulated capital as an important 
subsidiary motive or incentive. 
 
The “Pension Fund” 
The second solution was for the former employer to continue 
to care for its previous, retired employees in their old age, and 
to continue to pay them their salaries. This initially included 
only the personal servants of the very rich but was gradually 
extended. The basic logic is that in exchange for a certain 
period of service, if an employee achieved this, meaning they 
proved to be consistently loyal, the former employer kept the 
individual on the payroll until his/her death. Later, as it 
became more popular, they attempted to make it increasingly 
professional and assure the living of retired staff in their old 
age by setting aside the capital that would probably be 
required to enable payment of their pensions; they capitalized 
the annuity reserve, so to speak. The modern form of this 
solution is the pension fund, and originally the defined benefit 
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(DB) pension fund.  
However, what has simply been given the name 
“pension fund” is, in fact, a cumulative term for several 
solutions that, however, form a kind of evolutionary chain. A 
kind of logical reconstruction of this evolutionary chain may 
help to explain the justified or unjustified nature of certain 
solutions. 
The whole thing began with the remuneration of loyal 
servants (to lords, kings, and state officials), whom it was 
expedient to retire from service above a certain age, but who 
during their period of service had not accumulated enough 
assets to be able to live comfortably in their old age. The 
reward for their previously demanded a significant loyalty 
could not be that they should be destitute in their old age, and 
so their income continued to be provided to them, often in a 
similar manner as when they were in active service: in kind. 
The period spent in service was a kind of measure of loyalty, 
to which this benefit could be linked with a (high) minimum 
requirement. This is how the idea of “period of service,” 
which still exists there today, found its way into the pension 
system. In view of the fact that initially this kind of service 
was only available to the very few, which was further reduced 
by the fact that it required an extremely high period of service, 
and so few people survived to that age, and those who 
succeeded did not have many years left, initially the system 
did not cost too much for those who provided the service, and 
therefore there was no particular need to set aside a reserve for 
this purpose. 
However, the method began gaining increasing 
popularity, meaning more people were included in this kind of 
service; private companies began to copy the practice, and the 
state itself also began employing increasing numbers of 
people, and accordingly keeping people who left active service 
on the simple payroll became an increasing burden. In 
addition, private companies were not necessarily very stable or 
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long-term institutions such as the state, and accordingly, the 
beneficiaries of the service also wanted some kind of 
guarantee that they will still receive it if the company happens 
to go bankrupt. The solution to this was the actuarial 
assessment and planning of the undertaken services, and the 
establishment of relative independence for the service within 
the company itself. This, in turn, led to efforts to temporally 
balance the burdens of the company, or rather the guarantor of 
the services, which meant the introduction of reserving. Once 
reserving was introduced, the question was often raised 
whether this should be organized independently, giving rise to 
the appearance of pension funds linked to companies, which 
were generally not fully capitalized, meaning the account did 
not contain the total capital required for the full provision of 
services, discounted by its expected yields. Accordingly, the 
bankruptcy of the guarantor could lead to a significant 
reduction of the services undertaken, which they attempted to 
prevent or avoid using several methods. Firstly, the expected 
level of funding of the pension fund, meaning the ratio of 
accumulated capital to the value of the undertaken services 
that had to be reached, was set increasingly higher. Secondly, 
the independence of the pension fund from the guarantor 
company was also gradually increased, and particularly the 
fact that the company could not use the fund’s capital to 
handle its financial difficulties. Thirdly: a kind of inter-fund 
risk distribution was established in case of bankruptcy, 
meaning the introduction of mandatory guarantee funds and 
solutions. 
Meanwhile, the economic rationale behind the system 
remained unchanged: during the employee’s active age the 
employer did not pay out the full salary, but this was instead 
balanced throughout their entire remaining lifespan, in 
addition to applying risk distribution with relation to 
employees who attained differing lifespans, and by doing so 
the employee was also remunerated for their loyalty to the 
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company. So, in the beginning, pension funds, which are often 
also referred to as occupational pension systems, only paid out 
pensions at all concerning relatively high periods of service. 
The fact that employer pensions were tied to achieved 
long periods of service caused increasing tension after the 
method became popular, in view of the fact that this 
represented the main source of pension for more and more 
people, among whom an increasing number regularly changed 
workplaces. In addition, the economy also transformed, with 
many years spent at one workplace and loyalty becoming an 
increasingly unimportant value. Accordingly, employees 
increasingly began demanding that the pension entitlements 
they had already acquired should not be lost when they change 
workplaces, while employers were increasingly less inclined 
to use this method to also chain their employees to them. The 
portability of acquired pension rights was born, the simplest 
form of which is the transfer of capital between pension funds. 
However, this applied pressure to pension funds from two 
directions: (1) their level of capitalisation must be close to 
100%, because leaving employees will definitely be taking 
away 100% of the capital value of their previous entitlements, 
meaning that in the case of low-level capitalization those that 
remain (the “loyal” employees for whom the system was 
introduced in the first place) could find themselves in an 
extremely bad position, and (2) the capital value of the 
transferred entitlements must be easily calculable. 
These tensions all pointed in the direction that pension 
funds, and the occupational pension system in general, should 
become as similar as possible to pension insurance. In its fully 
developed form, a pension fund can be regarded as a partially 
capitalized DB system, given the fact that it made a 
predetermined promise of a pension using a pension formula 
to employees who achieve a predetermined service period. The 
DB system itself assumed the long-term stability of both the 
employer, the company, and the employment of the employee. 
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Both have since changed; the lifecycle of companies is 
becoming increasingly shorter, and their size and number of 
employees also fluctuate strongly over a longer period. As a 
result, companies can best fulfill their pension promises if they 
correspond to their performance capabilities to the maximal 
extent. Moreover, this means that they should not promises a 
level of pension that is realized in the distant future, but a pre-
set current contribution for employees that happen to be 
working there at the time, which means that pension funds 
have taken on an increasingly DC character. 
Today, a general tendency with relation to employer 
pension systems it that old-school DB funds are closed to new 
employees, and only DC funds are launched for new ones. 
This means that pension funds are increasingly converging 
towards insurance pension solutions. From among the 
previous solutions and key concepts of the occupational 
pension system, the service period has become outdated and 
uninterpretable. To an increasing extent, the only formal 
difference between pension insurance and pension funds is 
that employers pay contributions in one and employees pay 
into the other, but even this difference is beginning to 
disappear these days. 
It would seem that after their rapid proliferation and 
“heyday,” DB pension funds are beginning to be phased out, 
but they will probably never disappear completely. Their 
application may be reduced to that exclusive group, high-
ranked employees, for whom their predecessors were initially 
devised, and from where their expansion began. Occupational 
pension and pension insurance solutions are increasingly being 
combined into a fully capitalized DC system in which either 
employer or employee can be contributor in some, perhaps 
even changing form, but which is clearly owned by the 
employee, meaning it can naturally be transferred between 
pension funds and insurers, and entitlement is only dependent 
on reaching a certain age, with no role played by the 
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employee’s period of service. 
 
The Traditional Pension System 
The two solutions described above used to only provide old-
age security to a small, privileged group. For the “people,” 
who made up the vast majority, the solution was transferred 
within the family, which remained possible while the family 
model was several generations living together. Moreover, this 
was the norm right up until the industrial revolution (which 
occurred during a different period in Europe and the world’s 
countries—in some, it still has not occurred today), which was 
closely associated with the character of the economy and the 
distribution of labor. On the one hand, the economy was 
dominated by agriculture and family farms as the dominant 
“form of business,” in which practically every generation from 
the youngest to the oldest had their tasks in accordance with 
their age. The family living together was to all intents and 
purposes simply the logical result of this kind of distribution 
of labor, and of the fact that the “business” was passed down 
from father to son. Industry, which at the time formed a much 
smaller proportion of the economy, also meant artisan 
families, where the trade and its tools were passed down from 
father to son, and accordingly, multi-generational households 
were also the norm. 
However, the industrial revolution changed all this, 
predominantly by splitting multigenerational families through 
forcing young people to leave their families and move to 
industrial centers to work, because, in contrast to earlier 
industry and agriculture, modern industry required a 
concentration of population. This meant that young people 
who found themselves far from their parents could no longer 
support them directly, and of course, no longer possessed the 
consumer goods that they previously had as active agricultural 
producers. This meant they could only have supported their 
old parents with money, since they too no longer produced 
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consumer goods, but instead purchased them. Moreover, they 
were probably unable to do so initially because this element 
was not part of their wages (profit was realized instead, and 
accordingly the previous consumption of the older generation 
who was left to fend for themselves now facilitated the 
accumulation of capital). This put an end the previous state of 
affairs that is often referred to as the “natural” or “traditional” 
pension system.  
Considering the economic essence of the traditional 
pension system, which collapsed as a result of the industrial 
revolution, it can be stated that in many respects it corresponds 
to the pension insurance detailed above (towards which 
pension funds are also converging). This means: saving (the 
employer or employee saving part of the current income, 
meaning removing it from current consumption) in the active 
life stage, the investment of the saved monies, and the gradual 
spending of the investment and its returns in old age.  
The logic of the traditional pension system, on the 
other hand, is: raising children during one’s active career, who 
then maintain their parents when they are inactive. 
Economically, this can also be described by stating that partly 
resources are drawn away from current consumption by 
raising children (which is spend on children out of income), 
and partly an additional effort must be made in the interest of 
raising children (time that would otherwise be used for leisure 
or earning further income is invested in children). By doing so, 
value is being created from an economic perspective: the 
human capital that is embodied in children’s capabilities. 
When children maintain their parents in their old age (during 
their active career), they are able to do so by putting into 
operation their capabilities, meaning the human capital they 
have acquired with the help of their parents, which at this time 
they are partly spending on repaying the costs of this, and the 
interest on those costs, to those who at the time invested in 
advance in their human capital. So, the logic is the same as in 
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the case of pension insurance: restricting current 
consumption—saving/investment—spending the investment 
and its return. The difference is that in this case, the 
investment occurred in a special way (raising children) and in 
a special kind of capital (human capital), and until now this 
only happened in a particular (traditional) case of the division 
of labor, when different generations lived together and worked 
together in the family business. 
However, it is also different from pension insurance in 
that it includes no risk-sharing. The reason it exists in pension 
insurance is that the insurer handles the lifetime risk of many 
people in a single pool. From this perspective, the traditional 
pension system is as if there were lots of small insurers (the 
parents) with a few “clients” in a pool, meaning their children. 
For this reason, fluctuations in risk (“deviation” or “variance”) 
may be extremely high for those involved, especially if it is 
taken into consideration that at one time (during the era of the 
traditional pension system), mortality was different than it is 
today. It sometimes occurred that all of someone’s children 
died before they reached old age, and so they had no pension 
despite their investment. People also often died while still of 
active age, and so their children were exempt from having to 
repay the costs of their rearing. It did not occur often, but 
sometimes a late child did not enter active age by the time 
their parents had (would have) already become inactive. 
Moreover, finally: many people did not succeed in having 
children, despite wanting them. True, according to the logic of 
the traditional pension system the latter was easy to handle: 
one had to adopt one (or more) orphans, or one of many 
children from a poor family, or perhaps (according to the logic 
of pension insurance) the money saved by not raising children, 
or which was earned during the extra working time not spent 
on raising children, could be put aside. 
Despite all these limitations, the traditional pension 
system was a logically and economically well-built 
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construction—in contrast to the modern pension system that 
replaced it. 
 
The Muddled Development of the Modern Pension System 
Many trace the modern pension system back to Bismarck, 
although it was only born some 80 years ago via Roosevelt’s 
New Deal. Bismarck established a state system based on the 
logic of pension insurance (moreover, this is why it was 
named “insurance,” although with the “social” prefix), 
meaning it followed the pattern of saving—reserve 
accumulation—reserve spending with risk balancing, while all 
this was organized and made mandatory by the state. True, this 
system later received two major “shocks”: the First and the 
Second World War, in which Germany’s reserves lost all their 
value, but attempts at their re-capitalization were only 
abandoned in the 1950s (Németh, 2009; Werding, 2014), 
probably as a result of the American system, which had been 
developed by then. 
The American system was admittedly an 
improvisation, without any kind of fundamental principle. The 
goal was for a relatively large number of people to receive a 
pension relatively soon after the system was launched, which 
also meant that pensioners did not have enough time to 
accumulate enough capital from their savings to receive a 
suitably-sized pension, meaning the logically and 
economically pure Bismarckian solution could not be applied. 
For this reason, the system did not even aim to have suitable 
reserves with which to cover the services it undertook to 
provide to new entrants, and as such also if new payments 
cease, as is self-evident in the case of pension insurances and 
the original Bismarckian system that follows the same logic. 
Instead, only a kind of liquidity reserve was established, and 
instead of accumulating and investing contributions, they were 
immediately put towards current payments. For this reason, 
opposers of the system immediately branded it as a Ponzi 
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scheme and, although somewhat reluctantly, the operators of 
the system were also inclined to regard it as such. This state of 
affairs continued for around 20 years until the appearance of 
Samuelson. 
The elements of the American system (or rather the 
system that later became popular in the modern world as the 
modern, PAYG-type pension system) were patched together 
from otherwise logically ill-fitting elements of pension 
insurance schemes and pension funds (occupational pensions). 
The element according to which the basis and source of 
following services is the payment of regular, individual 
contributions (as opposed to the ad hoc payments made by the 
employer in the case of employer pension system), was 
adopted from pension insurance schemes, to which logically, a 
DC system belongs. The fact that the system is DB-based, was 
adopted from employer pension systems, in which the level of 
pensions was determined according to a pension formula that 
was constructed based on the service period, which indicated 
loyalty (this was a forced element due to the fact that they 
wanted to provide pensions quickly, before the payments of 
older members provided the required collateral to cover this). 
Moreover, finally, the practice according to which the pension 
fund must not always be filled up to 100% was also taken 
from here, where the employer guaranteed payment as a 
“sponsor.” This “motive” was later “overstrained” to the 
extreme, meaning that to all intents and purposes they totally 
gave up on filling up the system—despite the fact that 
employers did not uphold the system as guarantors. This role 
of sponsor/guarantor was taken over from them by the state.  
The various elements of the system were apparently 
not in harmony with each other, because they pieced together 
the incompatible elements of logically pure pension systems. 
If individual payments are the basis for the pension, then the 
pension must fundamentally use a DC system, in which the 
period of service has absolutely no place. If the period of 
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service is essential, then it rewards loyalty to the employer, in 
which case the employer should have been forced to establish 
a DB system for everyone, for example, an occupational 
pension system, or to act as guarantor for a system of this kind 
operated by the state. However, contributions were made 
individually or at least were regarded as such, even if they 
were based on a kind of tax on income paid into the system by 
employers. The state should not have disregarded the need to 
capitalize on the system, even if initial pensioners received 
larger payments that could be financed by their contributions. 
This should have been covered by other revenues. True, in this 
case, the state would have accumulated a huge reserve than 
needed investment, which would have been unfavorable from 
several perspectives. On the one hand, state officials are not 
particularly capable of making good investment decisions 
(nobody trained them to do so, in addition to which they must 
conform to totally different expectations than their colleagues 
in the private sector), and in addition the danger of corruption 
would have increased to a great extent, and finally the state 
would easily have regarded this reserve as (easily borrowable) 
money that can be spent on its own goals, meaning it would 
have converted it into sovereign debt. The operators of the 
system “saved on” these important problems by intrinsically 
not accumulating reserves (except a kind of liquidity reserve). 
It is interesting, however, and is indicative of a kind of 
tunnel vision, that when the elements of the new pension 
system were patched together from the elements of two 
logically pure pension systems, they totally disregarded the 
third, the traditional pension system. They did not even 
attempt to take elements from that, although the modern 
pension system fundamentally wanted to give pensions to 
people who once relied on the traditional pension system, 
meaning that to all intents and purposes one replaced the other. 
This, however, was probably intrinsically prevented by the 
fact that the science of economics was at the time still unable 
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to establish these principles at all. This would have required 
the—at the time non-existent—idea of human capital, and also 
that the traditional pension system is regarded as a proper 
construction, and not as nothing more than a kind of 
(humorous) economic anecdote. 
 
Samuelson’s Solution—and Its Problems 
So, in the late 30s and early 40s in America, the elements of 
two consistent pension systems were patched together into an 
inconsistent one, with relation to which its supporters to all 
intents and purposes agreed with its opposers, that it was a 
Ponzi scheme. This state of affairs changed radically in 1958 
when Samuelson published an article (Samuelson, 1958), the 
extremely complicated title of which made absolutely no 
reference to pensions. The theoretical goal of the study was to 
find an example of the fact that the free market mechanism 
does not always assure a socially optimal solution in a 
particular situation. And for Samuelson this example was 
pensions in an abstract economy with no money in which an 
excess number of children are readily available without any 
particular effort (or as the author of an article published 50 
years later in celebration of the original paper stated, in jest, 
but without any malicious intent: as if they were aliens from 
space, or who had been laid there by the stork at the age of 20; 
Weil, 2008). According to Samuelson, in this abstract 
economy savings, and accordingly pension insurance and a 
pension fund, is not possible, because there is no money, and 
because the produced consumer goods are perishable. 
“Providently,” but without any particular theoretical 
justification and very briefly (“it went out of fashion”), he 
excludes the obvious solution to the pension problem, that 
children should maintain their parents, although he mentions 
that such a thing did exist at one time, but without justifying 
why it no longer exists today. Furthermore, later he assumes 
that this “at one time” was so long ago that the new solution he 
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describes has been in use for generations (it is worth noting 
that Samuelson’s simple assumption that raising children costs 
nothing is consistent with the assumption that children do not 
give back the costs of their rearing to their parents, because 
there were no such costs, there is nothing for them to give 
back, they owe them nothing. In other words, one theoretical 
error provides an excellent foundation for another—although 
until recently, most readers only regarded this as a method of 
simplification). 
According to such conditions—on a market basis—
there remained just one alternative for Samuelson to provide 
for old age consumption: if older active workers “blackmail” 
younger active workers, meaning older active workers forego 
part of their consumption in favor of younger active workers 
in exchange for younger active workers, when they become 
older active workers, foregoing some of their assets and 
consumption in favor of people who have in the meantime 
become inactive older people. The result is far from optimal 
because, in such a scenario, young active workers will 
consume their full production, plus part of the production of 
older active workers, meaning they will be practically 
drowning in “chocolate” (the only consumer item available in 
Samuelson’s abstract economy). Meanwhile, older active 
workers must in part give some of their chocolate to younger 
active workers, while also paying back the chocolate they 
received from older inactive workers when they were of active 
young age, meaning their consumption will fall radically, 
while they will also receive hardly anything during old age. 
The conclusion is that the free market mechanism does not 
create a social optimum in this situation, and it would be 
expedient for the state to interfere. Moreover, the state should 
interfere by taking away part of everyone’s production and 
giving it to the older, inactive generation by, in Samuelson’s 
example, assuring that everyone, both active and inactive 
alike, consumes the same quantity in the case of a stationary 
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population. In addition, he calculates that if the state applies 
this same ratio of deductions in the case of an increasing 
population, then the consumption of the older generation will 
be much higher than that of active workers, because they will 
receive the “chocolate” that was deducted from them when 
they were of active age plus interest—this is what he calls 
“biological” interest.2 
He calls the whole system a kind of new Hobbesian-
Rousseauian social contract that links generations to each 
other, including generations that have not yet been born. 
The paper was a huge success, the representatives of 
the American, non-capitalized pension system “recognized” 
their own system in the description, and were relieved that 
they were not operating a Ponzi scheme, but that behind their 
action, which was seemingly spontaneous and lacked any 
theory, lay a serious and radically new “philosophy”: 
solidarity between generations. Samuelson’s solution became 
the official philosophy of the PAYG pension systems, even 
though it is somewhat surprising why in fact the 
representatives of the modern American pension system 
“recognized themselves” in the description. Because the 
differences between the situation described by Samuelson and 
the American pension system in operation were vast, and to all 
intents and purposes evident to the reader: 
 America was far from being an economy with no 
money. However, in his article, Samuelson 
explained the impossibility of accumulating 
savings and with it the need for state intervention, 
precisely with the lack of money. This was so true 
                                                             
2
 Aaron later “corrected” Samuelson on this point, drawing attention 
to the fact that economic growth also contributes to this (Aaron, 
1966), and this is why the whole theory is often referred to as the 
Aaron-Samuelson theory, but this strand is of no interest to this 
study. 
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that at the end of his paper, he, in fact, notes that 
in the presence of money, other pension solutions 
are of course, possible. So, if money exists, why 
then should we have to resort to the instrument of 
the state establishing a new social contract? 
 In practice, biological interest, which was cited 
very often, and which was rapidly officially 
accepted within the PAYG system, did not really 
work in the way described by Samuelson. 
According to Samuelson, the “pension 
contribution” is a ratio of income that is 
permanently fixed in the long term, and this is 
why the consumption of pensioners increases 
hugely compared to consumption during active 
age in the case of a growing population. In other 
words, the logical order here is: pension 
contribution → pension. In practice, however, the 
equation was just the reverse (and remains so—
this was only changed by the NDC system, see 
Palmer, 2006): the operators of the pension system 
had an idea with relation to a “fair” level of 
pensions, which they determined with the help of 
a pension formula, and it was based on this that 
they determined the pension contribution that was 
required to enable them to provide this level of 
pension. Therefore, the actual logical order was: 
pension → contribution. As a result, biological 
interest was not just, or not necessarily, realized 
by pensioners, but they shared that with active 
workers such that, in the case of a growing 
population, pension contributions were relatively 
low. 
 The fact that the biological interest is not only 
realized by pensioners only truly becomes 
essential when the population begins to decline. 
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Samuelson may have mentioned this possibility 
(he even put forward examples: Ireland and 
Sweden), but he didn’t really examine the issue; in 
essence he suggested that the biological interest 
rate is positive, meaning that population is 
increasing, as was certainly the case during the 
baby boom that was in full swing when the article 
was written. Since according to Samuelson, the 
biological interest belongs to the pensioners, 
whether positive or negative, in the case of a 
declining population it means a falling pension 
because according to his paper pension 
contributions are fixed, and if those are only 
enough to provide a lower pension, that is what 
will be paid. In practice, however, this practically 
never happened this way. The most striking 
example of this is the fact that to all intents and 
purposes every PAYG system admits that behind 
it lies a vast sovereign debt that represents many 
times the annual GDP of the given country (and in 
fact, since 2017 in the European Union (EU) it has 
been compulsory for every member state to 
calculate and publish this). Samuelson did not use 
this idea yet (it was only “discovered” in 1974 by 
Martin Feldstein; Feldstein, 1974), but he did not 
have to use it because in the system he devised the 
implicit sovereign debt it 0. Moreover, this 
represents a vast difference compared to actual 
PAYG systems. 
Overall, it may be stated that Samuelson did not 
establish the general philosophy of the PAYG pension system, 
but only a concrete example of it that only began being 
“discovered” and introduced after the end of the millennium. 
This is the total contribution indexed Notional Defined 
Contributions (NDC) pension system, which has been 
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introduced in Italy and Poland
3
 (in which the long-outdated 
service period was finally “forgotten”). Taking a look at the 
system, Samuelson’s description fits perfectly, since: 
 Samuelson to all intents and purposes described a 
DC pension system with a fixed contribution 
rate… 
 …from which as high a pension as possible is paid 
out (as assured by total contributions indexing) … 
 … and in which the biological interest rate can 
also be negative (in the case of a decreasing 
population, the total contributions index can easily 
become negative) …  
 … and in which the implicit sovereign debt is 
zero. 
It is characteristic, however, that this relationship has 
still not been “officially” discovered today in pension system 
economics, and in fact, for a long time, the NDC system was 
regarded as a kind of “aberration” compared to the “naturally” 
DB-type PAYG system.
4
 Although reading Samuelsson in 
retrospect, he, in fact, described a DC system (true, at the high 
level of abstraction in which his article existed, the DB and 
DC systems were, in essence, the same). In comparison, James 
Buchanan’s 1968 article (Buchanan, 1968) acted as a new 
revelation in pension economics, when he first proposed the 
NDC system. It was also left unnoticed for a long time that in 
contrast to Samuelson’s foundations, PAYG systems 
                                                             
3
 The Notional Defined Contributions (NDC) system is often 
referred to as the “Swedish system,” because the first NDC system 
was introduced there. However, their indexing is not based on a total 
contribution index but is much more complicated in view of the 
system’s significant capital. 
4
 As admitted by Robert Holzmann—at least with relation to the 
World Bank—at the Budapest launch of the Holzmann, Palmer, and 
Robalino (2013) publication. 
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accumulate a huge implicit sovereign debt, and this was only 
examined and calculated following Feldstein’s article in 1974. 
This may be interpreted by stating that it was then that it was 
discovered that the operation of a PAYG system constructed in 
this manner requires the state to take on a vast, undetected 
loan, which may also be regarded as a continuous and 
substantial Keynesian stimulus. The methodology of 
generational accounting was created to detect this loan taken 
on for pension purposes, and since it had been established all 
other loans, and to calculate its distribution between 
generations (Auerbach et al., 1994; Kotlikoff, 1993). 
If, according to the above, the Samuelsson-based 
pension system is reduced to a total contributions-indexed 
NDC pension system with no implicit sovereign debt, it may 
be stated that this is not a Ponzi scheme, because the assets 
and liabilities of the system’s balance sheet move parallel to 
one another. It is, of course, another matter that in the case of a 
continuously decreasing population the pension paid out by 
the system will either be continuously lower, or the age of 
retirement will have to be regularly increased, meaning the 
pensioner-protection function of pensions will be strongly 
eroded. However, upon examination of the usual PAYG 
systems with high implicit sovereign debt, it becomes clear 
that the very existence of this implicit sovereign debt points to 
what extent it is based on the logic of a Ponzi scheme in which 
revenues are immediately recategorized as dividends with the 
omission of the investment period, while those liabilities are 
also kept on the books (as if these revenues had been 
invested), meaning that in essence the liabilities side of the 
balance sheet “snowballs” independently from the assets side. 
So, in summary, what may be stated about 
Samuelson’s article is that is provided with an elegant solution 
to an imagined situation and provided an ideology to a pension 
system that did not yet exist at the time, and which had little to 
do with actual PAYG pensions systems. However, everyone 
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wanted to believe in it, and this “inclination” still exists today. 
For instance, this is probably why the Germans gave up on 
their previous plan to recapitalize their Bismarckian system 
and decided instead to transform it into a “modern” PAYG 
system—clearly based on the American model, although the 
citing of Samuelsson never really gained popularity in 
Germany. 
In his article, Samuelson himself, on the one hand, 
avoided referring directly to the existing modern American 
pension system, since he stressed that the accumulating of 
reserves is possible in the presence of money, and it is as if he 
himself also believed that logically, only capitalized pension 
systems should be allowed in modern times. However, he was 
clearly “winking” at the existing pension system because, from 
among the possible alternatives that deserve further 
examination, he was quick to dismiss (and without any 
particular justification) the logical solution to the modern 
pension system, namely that it should be a modern version of 
the traditional pension system that it replaced. Although it 
would have been possible to choose a different solution, and it 
is still possible today, as will be described below. 
Overall, Samuelson only seemingly put the modern 
system that until then lacked any theory in order theoretically, 
and in fact only increased the confusion with relation to it, 
which still exists today. True, according to the principles of 
economics that existed at the time, it would have been difficult 
to determine; it is, however, possible to determine it today. 
Accordingly, the theoretical possibility now exists to provide a 
philosophy for modern pension systems that better describes 
its essence and based on which several essential changes will, 
of course, have to be made to its design. 
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The Chance for a Logically Pure PAYG 
What They Did Not Do at the Time 
It is interesting that despite the fact that they were clearly 
aware of the fact that most people used to receive old-age care 
(to all intents and purposes: a pension) from their children, and 
the economic foundations for this were also evident (“in 
exchange for being raised”), it wasn’t even considered that this 
same principle should also be applied to the modern pension 
system. Meaning that someone receives a pension because 
they raised contribution-paying children, and the payment of a 
contribution is itself a method of repaying the costs of being 
raised, which everyone owes—primarily to those who raised 
them (who are usually, but not always the parents), and 
secondly to taxpayers, thanks to whose contributions they had 
access to certain services in childhood (primarily towards their 
education). Meaning that the mandatory contribution payment 
of active workers could have been introduced as a matter of 
course without having to promise anything in return to 
contributors. Because everyone owed (and still owes) a 
contribution (or at least a contribution with an economically 
well-founded, carefully calculated level and period) to their 
parents, and to taxpayers. Instead, this debt was simply 
waived, without having truly noticed this fact. Moreover, they 
did so just as the cost of raising children began getting 
increasingly high (meaning the debt owed by children became 
increasingly large, and interestingly, the period spent in 
retirement, and which therefore needed to be financed, also 
began increasing almost parallel to this), and the costs are 
continuing to increase today (as has the number of years spent 
in retirement), meaning this gesture didn’t really have any 
financial basis. Because by doing so, they declared and 
assumed that: 
1. No financial compensation is due for the 
increasingly expensive act of raising a child; it is 
something everyone does “of their own accord,” 
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meaning the income earned during their active 
career must also cover those costs. 
2. People must also extract their pension from their 
income during active age. 
3. Even under such conditions, they will undertake 
to have and raise a suitable number of children. 
Of course, if a society has been doing this for 
generations, then the waiving of the costs of raising children 
only causes additional burdens for the generation that does not 
receive a return on this investment for the first time, after 
which a new balance can develop—provided that (in contrast 
to the era preceding the modern pension system) enough 
children are born without any kind of financial incentive. 
However, this latter assumption has no true foundation, and it 
has since been proven that this is not the case, and in fact 
people react to the increasing cost of raising children in the 
same way they do if the price of any other “goods” increases: 
they reduce consumption (this has been specifically 
documented by pension researchers, e.g., see Gál 2003). This 
effect is compounded by the fact that thanks to birth control 
becoming simpler, the realization of this rational individual 
strategy has become much easier and (in stark contrast to 
earlier opportunities) requires practically no sacrifice. 
Looking back, as has already been noted, when 
Roosevelt introduced the modern pension system, experience 
with relation to the traditional pension system was not quite 
what Samuelson described (“it went out of fashion”). In fact, it 
was the traditional family farm/business and the traditional 
division of labor that had broken down; children moved out 
from their parents, and it was easy for them to refuse to pay 
them back the cost of their being raised in the form of old-age 
care. While generations lived together, there were of course 
also children who would have been glad to save on these 
expenses, but at the time the public opinion of their place of 
residence (generally small settlements where people knew 
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each other well) required the enforcement of this old social 
contract. When young people moved into big cities, this 
coercive force was eliminated. It was, therefore, an absolutely 
logical demand that the state should step in as coercer. This 
did not require a new social contract; however; it would have 
been enough to force the operation of the old social contract 
under these new conditions. 
The Rooseveltian modern pension system is 
traditionally described such that its greatest winners were 
those who retired immediately after it was introduced, 
following only a short period of contribution payments, 
because they received an extremely high pension compared to 
their paid contributions. If the above logic is accepted, 
however, a totally different picture is arrived at: the majority 
of needy older people at the time were those whose children 
had refused to maintain them, meaning to pay back the costs 
of their rearing (and possibly the interest on that) in old age in 
accordance with the old social contract. Accordingly, it would 
have been entirely justified to tax active workers and distribute 
the tax among their ageing parents without those parents 
having to pay any kind of contribution. Moreover, to naturally 
promise the same to active workers: their children will also be 
taxed, and that will be distributed between them, depending on 
their efforts in relation to raising those children. From many 
perspectives, this system would have been very similar to the 
one that was realized, but without the element according to 
which a pension is due concerning the payment of 
contributions. A pension would have been due in exchange for 
raising a child, meaning for the creation of the human capital 
that is embodied in active workers. Moreover, the 
tax/contribution would have been the repayment of this.  
From this perspective, the winners are not really those 
who first received a pension, but earlier people, who neither 
cared for their parents nor paid contributions. This, however, 
is only the first approach to the problem. It is, for instance, 
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possible—and this would require a deeper analysis of 
economic history, and for this reason, is only being raised as a 
hypothesis—that not even they were the true winners. It is 
possible that the employers of the first young peasants to flow 
into industry did not pay, as part of their wages, the element 
that would have made them capable of repaying the costs of 
their childhood. This element simply became profit, meaning 
that as a result, the missing consumption of older people who 
received no care also contributed to the accumulation of 
capital. In this interpretation, the introduction of contribution 
payments necessarily led to an increase in wages, and reduced 
profits, and as a result the maintaining of old parents was 
finally incorporated into wages, and the accumulation of 
capital to the detriment of the consumption of older people 
was eliminated (meaning that even in this manner, a kind of 
Keynesian stimulus would have been realised without any 
kind of implicit sovereign debt, because the part of the profits 
that was ready to “settle” as savings would have been 
delivered to people who generally would have used it for 
immediate consumption—to increase their income—to all 
intents and purposes in the same manner as was actually 
realized).  
However, it is also evident that when the modern 
pension system was improvised, it, in general, lacked 
principles, and when principles were eventually found, they 
were the principles of something else, and therefore proved 
unfit to suitably handle the problem. However, this only 
became obvious after a very long time (and is still only visible 
to few people today), when it transpired that more and more 
people are deciding not to set their minds on raising children, 
which in the meantime had become extremely expensive and a 
bad deal, or similar to other highly desired luxury items such 
as sports cars and yachts to delay what has ultimately been 
reclassified as a luxury until they eventually run out of time, 
and the whole previous construction falls into crisis, and as a 
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result the Ponzi scheme nature of the system becomes 
increasingly apparent. 
It may also be stated that when society “wrote off” 
and “threw away” the traditional pension system and waived 
the requirement for children to pay back the cost of having 
been raised, they did so by simply transferring these costs onto 
their parents. They did so at a time when, thanks to the 
otherwise justified elimination of child labor, they stripped 
childbearing of its last individual economic advantage. In 
other words, from this point on a kind of “losers” competition 
began at a social level to see who is prepared to have children 
even under such conditions. It may be stated that society’s 
most crucial long-term undertaking—its own regeneration—
was turned into a bad deal and was fully transformed into the 
result of a solely subjective insight. Moreover, they were 
unaware of all this, and in general, this realization has still not 
been widely recognized even today. 
 
What They Should Have Done 
Based on the above, it is, however, clear what should have 
been done at the time instead of creating the patchwork 
modern pension system, and what should be done now instead 
of trying to keep it alive: 
1. It should have been made clear that under the new 
conditions the modern pension system is 
replacing its predecessor, the traditional pension 
system, meaning that it is based on the repayment 
of the costs of raising a child for those who have 
undertaken to pay them. This is in the most part, 
the merit of parents (or foster parents) and to a 
lesser degree of general taxpayers. Meaning that 
the modern pension system is the restoration of 
the no-longer-operating traditional pension 
system, with state assistance. 
2. Accordingly, it is mandatory to pay a pension 
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contribution based on a well-calculated 
contribution rate, but that in itself does not 
generate a pension entitlement. Only the raising 
of a contribution-payer will provide entitlement 
to a pension (at least from this system). 
3. Of course the state could have simply declared 
that it is the obligation of children to maintain 
their parents (as China recently did
5
), but it was 
partly too late to do so (because presumably this 
part of wages had already been “swallowed” by 
employers, meaning they would have had to be 
forced to incorporate this into wages in some 
way, e.g., through taxes), and in part it was 
capable of offering a better construction than the 
traditional pension system. The essence of this is 
that it widely realized the risk-sharing that was 
missing from the traditional pension system, 
meaning it applied modern insurance techniques 
in the interests of making the burden on children 
(e.g., the payment of contributions) independent 
from the actual age of their parents (meaning it is 
made calculable for them), in addition to making 
the parents’ pension relatively independent of at 
what stage their children’s career, income 
generation, and contribution payment capabilities 
happen to be. 
They are meaning that the fund accumulated from 
                                                             
5
 See: Constitution (2004): “Article 49—Marriage, the family and 
mother and child are protected by the State. Both husband and wife 
have the duty to practice family planning. Parents have the duty to 
rear and educate their children who are minors, and children who 
have come of age have the duty to support and assist their parents. 
Violation of the freedom of marriage is prohibited. Maltreatment of 
old people, women and children is prohibited.” 
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contributions should have been distributed based on people’s 
contribution to creating contribution-payers. Raising more, or 
more successful (with higher incomes, e.g., generally more 
highly trained) contribution-payers equates to a higher pension 
than raising fewer or no contribution-payers. People are also 
eligible for something if they raise no children since they have 
also contributed to the education of the new generation 
through paying taxes, as the cost of their education was in the 
most part covered by contributions on the part of taxpayers. 
Such a system, of course, does not provide a suitable 
pension to people who do not raise children, or only from an 
extremely high age. However, they have saved the costs of 
raising children (regardless of whether the lack of children was 
the result of a conscious calculation on their part or a deeply 
traumatic tragedy), so it would not have caused difficulties for 
them to put the saved money aside in a pension insurance 
scheme and have that as the primary source of their pension. 
When this system was introduced some 80 years ago, there 
was, of course, no time to devise a separate system for older 
people with no children, the construction of which requires a 
few decades. However, it would also not have caused a 
problem if, following the declaration of the repayment of the 
costs of child-raising as the underlying principle behind 
pensions, people without children would also have temporarily 
not been excluded from the system, but instead the risk of 
having no children would have also been handled as a 
distributable risk until the elapsing of a certain period of 
preparation, which at the time roughly corresponded to reality. 
It is, of course somewhat more complicated to operate 
such a system than the realized PAYG system because more 
data needs to be kept on file, not just the contribution 
payments and service period. Questions are also raised in 
relation to the fair level of contributions, the extent of the 
contribution payment period, and based on what principled 
should the paid contributions be distributed between old 
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parents/guardians. These are problems that can be solved, 
however, and it is still possible to determine general principles 
today that grasp the essence of the system and do not consider 
less important individual details. Furthermore, such a system 
is capable of operating for a long time such that it begins with 
generous estimates, and the details are continuously refined, 
parallel to the collection and processing of the required data. 
 
What Can Be Done Today? 
Today, the situation is much better in all respects compared to 
Roosevelt’s era. Sufficient data is available, and it can no 
longer be claimed that the pension system must be necessarily 
highly simplified because of the need to keep records 
manually since a cheap and infinite computer capacity is 
available. Accordingly, the reform of the existing PAYG 
system can be realized as a matter, of course. One possible 
schedule: it is declared that the basis of the pension is an 
individual investment, of which there may be two types: child-
raising efforts or individual savings—or possibly a 
combination of the two. The payment of contributions is 
mandatory (because this is the repayment of the costs of 
raising children—it is expedient to place this period nearer to 
the second half of the active career, so the family budget isn’t 
burdened simultaneously by contribution payments and the 
cost of raising children) for a determined period (e.g., 30 
years), but no pension is due in return (although failure to pay 
will result in a reduced pension). However, this principle 
would only apply to those who are suitably young: for 
instance, to those who are at least 25 years from achieving the 
age of retirement, and not at all to those who are only 5 years 
from retirement. A pro-rata combination of the old and new 
system would apply to those in between, meaning it would be 
realized gradually, while leaving everyone enough time to 
adapt to it with their individual life strategies. Usually, it 
would be assumed that everyone chooses exclusive savings 
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instead of raising children, so new employees would begin 
paying contributions into a mandatory pension insurance 
scheme. This contribution is reduced if they begin raising a 
child and is eliminated altogether if they begin raising another. 
Meaning they would not need to simultaneously pay in two 
directions; raising a child will not represent an additional 
burden, but not having children will also not be an 
economically favorable choice in the short term. 
The annually accumulated contributions could be 
distributed among older people according to a kind of points 
system. Points would fundamentally be distributed based on 
the period of child-raising (considering that the person of the 
child-raiser may change over time), the number of children, 
and their expected contribution payment capacity. The latter 
can be estimated in advance based on the level of education, 
for instance, but the method may be refined later based on 
experience. Some points are also given for general taxpaying, 
in view of the fact that children’s education was in the most 
part financed from that. It is expedient to apply some kind of 
proxy to estimate the level of individual tax payment. This 
could even be the contribution payment itself since this is 
probably in good correlation with it (although against it stands 
the fact that in this way it would seem as if contribution 
payments result in pensions, just like before). 
These are the most general principles of the system, 
although many further details could be described, of course, 
but that would exceed the capacity of this chapter. Overall, 
such a solution would eliminate the implicit sovereign debt 
that lies behind the modern pension system, as well as all of 
the demographics-related sustainability problems (e.g., the 
destructive effect of ageing on the current PAYG system), 
since as a result all pension systems would become 
capitalized, in addition to which it would become clear that the 
realized PAYG system was merely a short, historical and 
theoretical oversight. Ageing could even be eliminated as a 
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result of this change, since raising children will once again be 
economically rational, and will definitely become neutral from 
the perspective of the pension system, because its Ponzi 
scheme character will be eliminated. 
 
Existing Reform Ideas—and Their Problems 
The above ideas are currently not part of mainstream pension 
theory and practice, and in fact, few people are aware of them. 
Thinking with relation to the future of the pension system is 
dominated by the fact that the realized PAYG system is taken 
as read, and the ideology it was given by Samuelson is 
accepted—without realizing the contradiction between the 
two. They are currently attempting to solve the pension 
problem caused by ageing in three other ways, but the success 
of all three solutions is doubtful. These are: 
1. Solutions within the pension system: 
a. The rationalization of the existing PAYG 
system.  
b. The rejection of the current system through its 
Chilean-style full capitalization. 
2. As an external solution: through immigration. 
These days, the demand for the introduction of NDC-
type pension systems is becoming increasingly strong 
(although the process has come to a halt somewhat these days, 
as analyzed by Guardiancich et al. (2019)). This may be 
interpreted as meaning that the Samuelsonian logic is being 
taken increasingly at face value, and pensions are increasingly 
being tied to actual contribution payments, and the various 
generous allowances that various strata of society have gained 
for themselves are being withdrawn, for example, it may also 
be defined as a kind of “back to basics” movement (although 
it’s supporters have not really noticed this).6 Overall, this 
                                                             
6
 The supporters of the NDC system regard it as a novelty (see 
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means the rationalization of existing PAYG pension systems, 
with the help of which their lifespan can be extended. 
However, this does not solve the fundamental problem, 
meaning that if ageing continues, then further restrictions will 
have to be introduced. The most logical of these is the radical 
and continuous increase of the age of retirement, through 
which the increasingly high implicit sovereign debt can be 
reduced. This can also be categorized as the usual reduction 
mechanism of high sovereign debt, its disinflation. This 
solution considers ageing caused by a lack of children and 
reduces pension promises through the continuous and robust 
reduction of pensions themselves, or their period. It does 
nothing to handle the basis of the problem, the fact that it was 
the modern pension system itself that turned to raise children 
into a bad deal, and in fact it increases unfairness towards 
people who have children, because it distributes the negative 
effect caused by the general lack of children evenly among 
those who are responsible for it and those who do have 
children. 
The Chilean solution is extremely popular among its 
original planners, neoclassical economists, and of course, this 
is also the most popular solution among life insurers because it 
would potentially allow their business to grow to huge 
proportions. However, two objections can be raised to the 
system, both of which are practical rather than theoretical: 
1. The initial step in funding must assumable be the 
one-time acknowledgement or “printing” of the 
implicit sovereign debt, because long-term, slow 
capitalization solutions such as the 1998 
Hungarian pension reform managed by the World 
Bank (for its theoretical foundations, see World 
                                                                                                                     
Holzmann and Palmer, 2006; Holzmann, Palmer, and Robalino, 
2013). 
200 
 
Bank, 1994), according to experience, can easily 
be reversed politically. This means, however, that 
sovereign debt will increase to immense 
proportions. In addition to practical problems, 
this also raises the question of whether it is 
realistic that this debt can be worked off at all 
within a reasonable time (Banyár, 2017b). 
2. If the capitalization is realized such that in the 
long term the—now explicit—sovereign debt 
remains the primary capital behind the pension 
system, then to all intents and purposes nothing 
has changed. This points to the fact that such a 
“capitalized” pension system is practically the 
same as the realized PAYG system, and to the 
fact that not only is the pension system a Ponzi 
scheme, but so too is the practice of hugely 
increasing the sovereign debt, and thereby the 
burdens of future generations. Who must either 
undertake those, or escape from them somehow, 
and will most probably choose the latter, which 
raises grim prospects for the pension system, and 
for future pensioners (Banyár, 2017a). 
Immigration seems to be a logical and cheap solution. 
Moreover, indeed: why spend huge amounts of money on 
raising children if others are prepared to do so instead of us, 
and make the result available to us free of charge? It is more 
logical for people to spend this money on their own 
consumption, as has otherwise been the practice in developed 
countries in recent decades, thus leading to ageing as a 
financial problem. 
However, upon taking a closer look, it is evident that 
immigration is a deeply problematic solution, because, in 
developed Western economies in which the pension system 
has fallen into crisis because of ageing, not all kinds of 
immigrants can be suitably employed. There are many poorly 
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educated immigrants, mainly from Africa and the Middle East. 
It would definitely seem, however, that these will not be the 
saviors of the welfare systems of developed countries, but 
their further beneficiaries. The reason is simple: during the 
critical period of their raising, for example, in childhood, there 
was no concentrated, high-level investment in their human 
capital (in their training), which would make them suitable to 
stand their ground in the workplaces of developed countries. 
By the time they arrive as migrants, they are past the age when 
this could be done. The only remaining solution is to invite 
migrants from countries in which this early investment in 
human capital was realized. 
Moreover, this indeed works in the case of the EU: the 
rich EU member states attract the highly-trained workforces of 
less affluent member states. This also assists the further 
existence of their pension systems, meaning it handles the 
problem well for a time but at the price of exacerbating the 
problem in poorer member states (Banyár, 2014a). Meaning 
poorer member states do not enjoy the profits of the significant 
human capital investments they have realized, which will 
eventually lead to tensions in relations between affluent and 
less affluent member states. It would seem, therefore, that in 
developed countries the ageing problem cannot be solved 
without a human capital investment that is greater than the 
current one, one of the most obvious solutions to which, 
although undoubtedly not the only possible solution, would be 
the reorganization of the modern pension system as described 
above. 
 
The Logically Pure State Pension System in Literature 
In retrospect, it is interesting that despite the many 
inconsistencies described above, the majority of experts still 
believe that existing PAYG systems still have a coherent basic 
philosophy, the principle of solidarity between generations. It 
would seem that existing practices have “gouged” troughs in 
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the “neural pathways” of those dealing with the topic, into 
which thinking with relation to the subject slips back 
repeatedly, and which are difficult to leave. We do not have to 
go far for example: in 2003, the author of this chapter 
published a book in collaboration with József Mészáros 
(Banyár and Mészáros, 2003/2009), in which he cited this 
approach to existing PAYG pension systems as being self-
explanatory. He continued to do so—right up until 2014—
despite the fact that in 2005 he read a thought-provoking study 
on the subject by four Czech life insurance experts (Hyzl, 
Rusnok, Kulhavý and Řezníček, 2005), who in a logically 
totally coherent manner described the possibility of a new kind 
of PAYG system, which is to all intents and purposes the same 
as has also been suggested in this chaoter, above. 
It is also interesting that the supporters of pension 
systems based on raising children, who are thankfully 
increasing in number (Demény, 1987; Werding, 2014; Botos 
and Botos, 2011; Banyár, Gál and Mészáros, 2016; Giday and 
Szegő, 2018; Regős, 2015; Kovács, 2012), while pointing out 
the importance of raising children, want to recognize it as a 
contribution payment.
7
 They do not realize that contribution 
payments are not a legitimate claim for receiving a pension, 
but that they are the repayment of a previous debt, which may 
be mandatory, but this is where the comparison ends; it does 
not give rise to entitlements but closes an obligation that came 
about previously. This also indicates the extent to which the ad 
hoc, theoretically unfounded solutions of the modern pension 
system, which according to the standards of world history 
were only created “yesterday,” have “eaten their way” into 
people’s way of thinking, and that it is challenging to free 
ourselves from this burdensome inheritance. However, let us 
                                                             
7
 As indicated by Banyár, Gál, and Mészáros (2016), which was 
written in 2012-2013, this opinion was also shared by the author of 
this paper, but he changed his opinion (Banyár 2014b, 2016, 2017a). 
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trust that it is not impossible. A great deal depends on whether 
we do so or not. 
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